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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
District Court Case
:
No. 041906854

vs.
STEVE WALLACE CARTER,
Defendant/Appellant.

: Appellate Court
No. 20070323-CA
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated March 26, 2007. The
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at the
Utah State Prison. Jurisdiction for the appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

DID THE PRO SE MOTIONS AND LETTERS THE
DEFENDANT SENT TO THE TRIAL JUDGE
CONSTITUTE VALID MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Appellate Court must determine as a matter of law
whether the Defendant's pro se letters and motions constituted a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. This is a legal question; and, therefore, the trial court's
legal conclusions should be given no deference. "When a challenge to a trial
court's decision concerns a question of law, we accord no particular deference,
but review for correctness." State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah Ct. App.
1991). This issue was preserved for appeal when the Defendant filed a motion
and sent letters asking to have his plea withdrawn. (R. 126-130, 159-51, 154-55,
178)

II.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT DIDN'T GRANT THE DEFENDANT A
HEARING AND DIDN'T ALLOW THE DEFENDANT
TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: This should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard of review. "We review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802,
805 (Utah 1993). This issue was preserved when Defendant filed a motion as
well as a number of letters indicating that he wanted to withdraw his plea. (R.
126-130, 159-51, 154-55, 178)
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III.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO INQUIRE INTO DEFENDANT'S
COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS ATTORNEY?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue should be reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard of review.

u

[w]hether to appoint a different lawyer for an

indigent defendant who expresses dissatisfaction with the court-appointed counsel
... is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be
reversed only for abuse of discretion." State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987). This issue was preserved for appeal when Defendant wrote letters
to the trial court asking to have a new attorney appointed to represent him. (R.
126-130, 159-51, 154-55, 178)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated
§58-37-8. Possession of a Controlled Substance Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i)
for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it
was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a
practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice,
or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;

§58-37a-5. Unlawful acts.
(i)

(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use,
drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,

~3

manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test,
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or
otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in
violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
§77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1)
(2)

A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily
made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a
plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is
announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is
denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea
shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period
specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78,
Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2)

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital
felony;

Utah Rules Of Criminal Procedure
Rule 11. Pleas
See Addendum A.
Rule 12. Motions.
(a)

Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which,
unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance
with this rule. A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the
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grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not be
accompanied by a memorandum unless required by the court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was initially charged by Information with Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §58-378(2)(a)(i), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of U.C.A. §58-37a-5(l). The information was amended at least twice,
and the Defendant was ultimately charged with a first degree felony for
Possession with the Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance with an
enhancement for having a prior conviction. (R. 40-41, 79). A preliminary hearing
was held on the amended charge, and the Defendant was bound over. (R. 85-86).
This matter began with Defendant's arrest on December 15, 2004. Due to
numerous continuances the Defendant was not sentenced until March 20, 2007.
In between that time, Defendant was arrested, convicted and sentenced to prison
on an unrelated matter out of Davis County.
This case was eventually set for trial on February 1, 2006. (R. 95-96). The
Defendant was to be tried for a first degree felony charge of Distribution of a
Controlled Substance with a prior conviction for distribution of a controlled
substance. On February 1, 2006, a jury was called and seated. However, before
witnesses were called to testify, the Defendant and the State reached an agreement
wherein the Defendant pled guilty to a second degree felony charge of possession
~5~

of a controlled substance. The charge was enhanced to a second degree felony
based on the Defendant's prior conviction for distribution.

(R. 211/2-19).

Sentencing was scheduled for March 14, 2006. (R. 211/14). Defendant
was represented by attorney Roy Cole at the time he entered into his plea.
After the Defendant pled guilty, he began sending letters and "pro se"
motions to the trial court. One was titled "Motion to Appoint Replacement
Counsel for Appellant." (R. 126). In that motion he asked for his attorney to be
replaced. He also filed a motion titled "Motion to Dismiss Counsel, Motion to
Vacate Decision, and Motion to Appoint Attorney." (R. 127). In this motion the
Defendant articulated a number of reasons why his attorney was essentially
ineffective. The Defendant complained because his attorney told him that he had
to plead to a charge that carried a one to fifteen sentence or that the State was
pursuing a sentence of five years to life. The Defendant also complained that his
confrontation clause rights were violated when he didn't get to cross-examine the
witnesses. The Defendant also alleged that his attorney failed to assist him in pretrial discovery. In this motion the Defendant requested that his plea be vacated
and that a new attorney be appointed. This motion was signed on February 7,
2006. (R. 130).
On March 14, 2006, the Defendant was present with attorney Martin
Gravis. His sentencing was continued to May 16, 2006, because he indicated he
was going to retain private counsel. (R. 135). On May 12, 2006, the trial court
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received a letter from the Defendant. In this letter the Defendant informed the
trial court that this case helped him realize that he needed treatment. He also told
the court that he believed his attorney counseled him correctly. He also wrote that
he has bi-polar disorder and A.D.D. with schizophrenic elements and that his
therapist explained to him that he attempts to self-medicate. He concluded by
apologizing to the court for the trouble he had caused and indicated that he would
accept any "treatment, supervision, or consequences" that the court deemed to be
necessary. (R. 139).
On May 16, 2006, the Defendant asked to continue his sentencing because
he needed additional time to retain private counsel. The sentencing was continued
until July 11, 2006. (R. 143). On July 11th the Defendant asked for another
continuance to retain private counsel. Sentencing was continued until August 1,
2006. (R. 146).
On August 1, 2006, the court received a motion from the Defendant titled
"Motion for Dismissal." (R. 149). In this motion the Defendant indicated that he
was "paranoid schizophrenia," and at the time of his plea he was not on
medication. He claimed that his mental disorder is marked by "loss of awareness
of reality often with disturbances of behavior and the inability to reason." He
further claimed that his attorney was not aware of his mental disorders and
therefore his attorney, Roy Cole, could not fairly defend him. The Defendant
claimed that he was diagnosed with his mental disorder after he entered his plea.
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He asked to withdraw his plea based on the mental disorder. He further claimed
that "he did nothing", that the "drugs and things used to do drugs were not finger
printed/' and that he was "set up by the lady that lived in the apartment." He also
claimed that at the time of his arrest he "was confused and did not know what he
said to arresting officers." The Defendant went on to ask the court to "dismiss
this case without prejudice." (R. 149-151).
At the Defendant's sentencing on that same date the matter was continued
so the Motion to Dismiss and the Defendant's mental status at the prison could be
reviewed. Sentencing was continued until September 12, 2006. (R. 152). On
September 11, 2006, the court received another letter from the Defendant. In this
letter the Defendant indicated that he was having problems communicating with
his attorney. He also wrote the court that he entered the plea based on his
attorney's advice that it was the best deal he could get. The Defendant explained
that he "did not commit any crime except consumption of an illegal substance."
He further stated that "I only, and in a once and brief moment, shared a pipe with
the owner of the drugs." He told the judge that he was "a stupid drug user where I
travel down the wrong path in a mis-guided attempt to self-medicate the pain my
mental illness causes me." He asked the judge to not sentence him until a
"thorough investigation" was made of his mental illness. (R. 154-55).
On September 12, 2006, the matter was continued until October 10, 2006,
so Mr. Cole could obtain the Defendant's mental health records from the prison so
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a determination could be made as to whether or not to proceed with sentencing.
(R. 158). On September 12th it was continued until October 31st because Mr. Cole
had not received the mental health records. (R. 163).
On October 30 the court received a letter from the Defendant where he
requested a copy of his plea agreement.

He wanted to see if Mr. Cole

misrepresented him to the nature of the plea. He wanted to make sure he pled to
use of a controlled substance rather possession or distribution. (R. 167).
On October 31st sentencing was continued until December 12, 2006,
because Mr. Cole had still not received the mental evaluations. (R. 169). On
November 20 , Mr. Cole filed a motion to compel the mental health records from
the Utah State Prison. (R. 171). On December 12th the matter was continued until
January 16, 2007, because Mr. Cole hadn't received the mental health records.
(R. 174). On January 16th, sentencing was continued until February 6, 2007. (R.
176). On February 5, 2007, the court received another letter from the Defendant.
He complained that he hadn't had adequate communication with his attorney. He
also complained of "being bounced around the legal system" for two years
without due process. He concluded by saying u[a]t this juncture either dismiss
this case (which is warranted as reflected by the lengthy record) or go ahead and
railroad me into a wrongful conviction and sentence, but do so with the
appointment of legal appellate counsel so that I can take a first appeal of right and
be heard on the truth that there is not a factual basis for the conviction and I
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entered into it on a plea of guilty that was not made knowingly and
willingly/voluntarily because of my very real mental health and competency
issues that were ignored at the trial phase.'5 (R. 178).
On February 6, 2007, Mr. Cole still hadn't received the records from the
prison. The matter was continued until March 6, 2007. (R. 181). On March 6 ,
the Defendant was not present in court. However, Mr. Cole had received the
mental health records from the prison. Mr. Cole informed the court that he would
not be filing a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Sentencing was set for March
20,2007. (R. 183).
On March 20, 2007, the Defendant was finally sentenced.

He was

sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. He was given
credit for the time he had been in custody, and the sentence was ordered to run
concurrent with his prison sentence that he was serving on an unrelated matter.
(R. 186-87,212/7).
At his sentencing, the Defendant didn't ask to have his plea withdrawn.
Before the court proceeded with sentencing it asked the Defendant, "Mr. Carter,
anything you would like to say before sentence is imposed?" The Defendant
answered, "I just answer Your Honor to consider running it consecutive with the—
" His attorney corrected him and he said "concurrent with the charge I'm on."
(R. 212/3)
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The next day on March 21, 2007, the Court received a letter from the
Defendant. It was dated October 9, 2006, but not received by the Court until
March 21, 2007. In this letter the Defendant stated his desire to have his plea
withdrawn because of his mental illness and because his plea was entered
unknowingly and unwillingly and that he didn't have the mens rea necessary for
the conviction. (R. 188). On the same date the court received a letter that was
dated March 19, 2007. In this letter the Defendant asks for someone to evaluate
his mental state at the time he pled guilty. He asks the Court to help him enforce
his rights to a speedy trial and a knowing and willful plea. (R. 190). On April 11,
2007, the court received a letter from the Defendant that was dated April 9, 2007.
In this letter the Defendant informed the Court that he wanted to appeal his
conviction because his plea was not voluntary, there hadn't been a hearing to
determine his competence, and state funds hadn't been appointed for a forensic
psychiatrist to determine whether his plea was knowingly entered. (R. 194). A
Notice of Appeal was filed by counsel on April 17, 2007. (R. 198).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant was arrested on December 15, 2004, for being in possession of
methamphetamine. He was in a bathroom where two glass pipes and two baggies
of methamphetamine were located. The police officer who arrested him and filled
out a probable cause affidavit put in the probable cause affidavit that Defendant
admitted that the pipes and methamphetamine were his. (R. 003).
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The Defendant's charges were eventually amended to include a first degree
felony, for distribution of a controlled substance. A preliminary hearing was held
on that charge, and Defendant was bound over to stand trial. (R. 85-6). On the
day of trial after the jury had been selected, Defendant pled guilty to an amended
charge of possession of a controlled substance, with a prior conviction for
distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree felony. At the time the
plea was entered Defendant told the court that he knew what he was doing, and he
felt it was his best option. (R. 211/3-6). At the time of the plea, Defendant denied
that he took drugs to the home. He did admit that he "got high there" and that "I
admit that I used." (R. /21 1/3-4) The plea agreement was written to indicate that
Defendant was pleading to "use of a controlled substance." (R. 121-123).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant made a motion to the court where he expressed his desire to
have his plea withdrawn. He asserted that due to his mental illness his plea wasn't
knowing and voluntarily entered. Based on this motion the Defendant should
have been granted a hearing to determine if there was any validity to Defendant's
claims.
Defendant also complained of his relationship with his court appointed
attorney.

The trial court failed to inquire into Defendant's complaints to

determine if there was a valid reason to appoint a new attorney to represent the
Defendant.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE PRO SE LETTERS AND MOTIONS THE
DEFENDANT SENT TO THE TRIAL JUDGE
CONSTITUTED A VALID MOTION TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA.

The Defendant's pro se letters and motions which were sent to the trial
court present two issues. First, were the letters the Defendant sent to the trial
judge valid motions that should have been addressed?

Second, did the

Defendant's letters constitute a request to withdraw his guilty plea?
a.

The letters should be construed as motions to the court.
Under §77-13-6 of the Utah Code, a Defendant can move to withdraw a

plea of not guilty or no contest before the sentence is announced. The request
"shall be made by motion before sentence is announced."

U.C.A. §77-13-

6(2)(b)(2007). Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the
filing of motions. Rule 12 states that "[a]n application to the court for an order
shall be by motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or hearing shall
be in writing unless the court otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity
the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief sought." U.R.
CrJP. Rule 12 (2007).
In State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the Defendant filed
a "pro se motion with the trial court requesting substitution of counsel." Id. at
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961. This "motion" was apparently a letter because the Court of Appeals stated
"[i]n the letter, defendant stated he felt counsel could not represent him because
they had a "conflict of interest" and because counsel "refuses evidence I have
brought forth ... for defence [sic] of my case." Id.
State v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), is another Utah case
where the terms "letter" and "motion" are used interchangeably. In Canfield, the
appellant "sent a letter to the trial court seeking permission to withdraw his plea."
Id. The Defendant's "motion" was denied because it wasn't filed within thirty
days. In the opinion, this Court referred to the letter as a motion. "The letter was
date-stamped by the trial court clerk as filed on November 7, 1994. The trial
court denied the motion to withdraw and a related motion to dismiss because the
motions were not timely made,. .." Id. at 562.
The Defendant's letters and pro se motions should be recognized as a
timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In Defendant's motion to vacate he
wrote the trial judge asking "to vacate and to request a new trial and counsel." (R.
130). At another time, the Defendant filed a handwritten "Motion for Dismissal."
In this motion the Defendant informed the trial court that he suffered from mental
illnesses including bi-polar disorder. In paragraph seven of this motion, Defendant
asked the trial court to allow him to withdraw his plea. (R 149-151). In the letter
dated August 27, 2006, the Defendant informed the court that he suffers from
mental illness and believed that his illness may have rendered his plea
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involuntary. He further requested that he not be sentenced until a "thorough
investigation" had been made into his mental illness. (R. 154-55).
After receiving these letters and handwritten motions, the court continued
sentencing a number of times so Mr. Cole could obtain some mental health
records from the prison. After Mr. Cole obtained these records he informed the
trial court that he wouldn't be filing a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. (R. 18384).
In State v. West, 765 P.2d 891 (Utah 1988), the Defendant appealed from
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Defendant
had submitted a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 893. The Utah
Supreme Court stated that "Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
prepared pro se, is specifically based upon good cause. Although defendant might
have drafted the motion more artfully, his intention was clear." Id. at 894.
The Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reach the same
conclusion. Even though the Defendant might have drafted his request more
artfully, his intentions were clear. He repeated several times that he suffered from
mental illnesses that he believed had rendered his plea involuntary.

For this

reason, this Court should find that the Defendant's letters and handwritten "prose" motions were appropriate requests to withdraw his guilty plea, and the case
should be remanded to the trial court to determine if the Defendant's plea was
knowingly and voluntarily entered.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT DIDN'T GRANT THE DEFENDANT A
HEARING AND DIDN'T ALLOW THE DEFENDANT
TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA.

In Utah, "A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave
of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made."
U.C.A. §77-13-6 (2007). In State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), this Court held that compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure was not dispositive in determining a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
"A defendant can show good cause by putting forth evidence that the plea was in
fact involuntary." State v. Humphrey, 79 P.3d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
Once a Defendant presents evidence that the plea was involuntary, "the
court needs to assess the credibility of the evidence and make detailed findings on
all relevant facts." Id. Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires the trial court to state its findings on the record when factual issues are
involved in determining a motion. These findings must be sufficiently detailed to
allow this Court the opportunity to adequately review the decision. See, State v.
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In Humphrey, the defendant pled guilty and then filed a motion to
withdraw the guilty plea. A hearing was held, and the defendant argued that his
plea was not knowing and voluntary. He testified about his mental state on the
morning he entered the plea, and he presented correspondence from a social
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worker who had counseled him. State v. Humphrey, 79 P.3d at 961. The trial
court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw the plea. This Court stated that
"the record is unclear as to whether the court made the necessary credibility
assessment and factual determinations based on the evidence." Id. at 962
At the conclusion of the evidence in the trial court the judge had stated,
"my observations of the defendant at the time was that he understood what he was
doing; that he didn't appear to me to be under any more duress . . . . Fm going to
deny the motion because I believe that [it] hasn't met the objective standard and I
believe that anything that has been done here as the evidence today doesn't rise to
a level that would make me . . . both according to law [and] good conscience, you
know, grant the motion to withdraw the guilty plea." Id. (brackets in original)
This Court remanded the case so the trial court could make the necessary
factual findings to support its ruling. This Court found three reasons why the trial
court was in error. (1) The trial court had applied an objective standard. (2) The
trial court was uncertain as to whether it could consider the new evidence and
instead relied solely on observations at the plea colloquy. (3) Most importantly,
the trial court did not enter any detailed factual findings concerning the evidence
the defendant presented at the hearing on his motion to withdraw the plea. Id.
In the case at bar, the trial court could not enter any detailed factual
findings because the court didn't allow the Defendant a hearing and an
opportunity to present his evidence. In Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1988), the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In it he
expressed dissatisfaction with the plea and with his attorney.

The court

discharged his attorney and appointed a new attorney to advise him on his motion
to withdraw the guilty plea. Id. at 342. The court denied his motion and
sentenced him to prison. He eventually filed a motion for writ of habeas corpus.
This Court addressed the method by which to attack a guilty plea. Of importance
to this appeal is the following language found in the conclusion.
As we read the pertinent cases with an eye to harmonizing them,
challenge may be made to a guilty plea either directly or
collaterally. If it is made directly, it must be in the context of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the denial of which can be
appealed. If it is made collaterally, no prior motion to withdraw is
required. In either scenario, an evidentiary hearing must ordinarily
be held unless the record of a prior hearing show petitioner is
clearly not entitled to relief.
Id. at 344-45. Defendant was entitled to a hearing to determine if there was any
merit to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He is also entitled to sufficient
findings.

The Court also failed to enter detailed factual findings as to the

evidence the Defendant presented because no evidence was presented.

It is

impossible for this Court to determine if the plea was voluntarily entered and if
Defendant's mental illness had any bearing on the plea. For these reasons, this
case should be remanded to the trial court, Defendant should be appointed new
counsel, and a hearing should be held to determine whether there is a basis to
withdraw the Defendant's plea.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN
IT FAILED
TO
INQUIRE
INTO
DEFENDANT'S
COMPLAINTS
ABOUT
HIS
ATTORNEY.

A trial court has a duty to ensure that an indigent Defendant receives
effective assistance of counsel and that there is not a break down in
communication between the Defendant and his court appoint attorney. In the past
this Court has held that;
when a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, the court
must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine
the nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of the
facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship
with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that
sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that
his or her Sixth Amendment right would be violated but for
substitution.
State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In the case at bar, the
Defendant sent several communications to the trial judge where he requested a
new attorney. In February the court received a letter where the Defendant wrote,
"I feel that I need better effective assistance of councel [sic] on my behalf." (R.
125). On the same date the court received a motion titled "Motion To Appoint &
Replacement Counsel For Appellant." (R. 126). The court also received on the
same date a motion to dismiss counsel and to "appoint attorney." (R. 127-30).
In this motion the Defendant listed several reasons why he felt his attorney was
ineffective and that he needed a new attorney. (R. 127-130). On October 31,
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2006, the court received a letter from the Defendant where he informed the court
that Mr. Cole refused to communicate with him. (R. 167).
In State v. Vessey, this Court stated that "a trial court's refusal to substitute
counsel can only be properly reviewed if the trial court conducts a meaningful
inquiry. Only the trial court can conduct a full evidentiary hearing to explore the
substantiality of defendant's allegations without reference to subsequent
developments and later-acquired knowledge." State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d at 964.
In Vessey, this Court established the rule that "a trial court's failure to investigate
a defendant's timely substitution request is per se error, but eschewing actual
reversal until an actual conflict is established between the defendant and counsel
of a magnitude requiring substitution of counsel." Id at 962-63.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not inquire into Defendant's
dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel. Defendant made his request known to
the trial court on multiple occasions. At a minimum the trial court should have
inquired into Defendant's complaints and determined if there was any validity to
said complaints. Defendant respectfully requests that this matter be remanded
back to the trial court to determine if he should receive a new attorney and for a
hearing on his motions to withdraw his guilty plea.
CONCLUSION
Defendant was entitled to a hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea so the court could make adequate findings of fact to determine if the plea was
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voluntarily entered. For these reasons, the case should be remanded to the trial
court for a hearing on the motion and the Defendant should be appointed a new
attorney.
DATED this J_ day of February 2008.

BSWTSMITH
A

ftorneyfor Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300
South, 6-thm Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City

84114-0180, postage

prepaid this _]_ day of February 2008.

*K/

/L^EW.

SMT

' / 'Attorney at Law

21-

ADDENDUM A

~22~

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented
by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant
shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to
confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set
for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea
is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or,

if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility
of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or,
if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire
into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make
a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed
to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense,
or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected
by the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.

(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and
the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant
may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest,
reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of
the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who
prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the
other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a
whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is
not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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2

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 041906854 FS

STEVE WALLACE CARTER,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

SCOTT M HADLEY
March 20, 2007

PRESENT
Clerk:
marykd
Prosecutor: MAYNARD, BRANDON J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROY COLE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 19, 1959
Video
Tape Number:
H032007
Tape Count: 1007/1105
CHARGES
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 2nd Degree
Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/01/2006 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

041906854

Page 1

CD19533160
CARTER,STEVE WALLACE

Case No: 041906854
Date:
Mar 20, 2007

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The prison sentence imposed in this case may run concurrently to
the prison sentence the defendant is now serving.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends credit time served.

Dated this J?6

day of

?7fao<Ut

, 20^7 .

SCOTT M HADLEY
District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,
VIDEO TRANSCRIPT
VS.
CASE NO. 041906854
STEVE WALLACE CARTER,
DEFENDANT.

SENTENCING
MARCH 20, 2007
HONORABLE SCOTT M. HADLEY

-h * -k -k *

APPEARANCES:
FOR THE STATE:

BRANDEN MILES

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

ROY COLE

O
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
Rn1 ^ 9 s ins£

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Carter is back.

Where we at, Mr. Cole?
MR. COLE:

He's decided he wants to go ahead with

sentencing, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Is that the case, Mr. Carter --

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

-- that's what we're doing?

Okay.

I have read through the presentence report.

I

did -- and I've mentioned this before, found a correction or
at leasr an inconsistency on pages 2 and 8 of the original
presentence report.

It's where it says that he's never been

successful on probation and parole, and rhen later on it says
where he was successful.
THE DEFENDANT:
MR. COLE:

I have been successful, Your Honor.

He has actually been successful, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

So I think it was ]ust a little

overzealousness on the part of the original writer.
the

This is

—
MR. COLE:
THE COURT:

Well, it's called a typo.
That would be generous to him.

was the one given to Judge Page back m
MR. COLE:
THE COURT:

But this

June of '05?

Yeah.
Okay.

Okay.

You ready to go, then?

Diane W. Flanagan, PPR
801.395.1056

2

MR. COLE:

We are, four Honor.

THE COURT:
MR. COLE:

Okay.

Go ahead.

The event j_n this particular case

happened on about December 15th of '04.

He's been m

custody

continuously since that time and after he pled guilty on
March 14th of last year, as I recall, was supposed to be
sentenced -- actually supposed to be sentenced March 14th of
last year.

So it would have been about sometime early

February that he actually pled guilty on this matrer.
That means he has been m

for about two years and

four months, so we've got an awful lot of time he's been

m.

We're asking Your Honor since he's done all that time to give
him credit for time served, let him have drug board down at
the prison if he qualifies for that, and just run this
concurrent with the prison that he's already m

on since he's

done so much time.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Mr. Carter, anything you would like to say before
sentence is imposed?
THE DEFENDANT:

I just ask Your Honor to consider

running it consecutive with the -MR. COLE:

Concurrent.

THE DEFENDANT:

-- concurrent with the charge

I'm

on,
THE COURT:

Okay.

That -- is that the one with

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
PHI
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1

I Judge Page?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. COLE:

Yes, it is.

And still requesting drug board.
Yeah, Your Honor.

Pight?

I think it would

5

probably be a good idea to get him some points for getting

6

out.

7

THE COURT:

Okay.

8

recommendation from me.

9

THE DEFENDANT:

10

THE COURT:

11

THE DEFENDANT:

Now, you know that's 311st a

That's -I understand.

-- not m

my control.

I have completed their -- one of

12

their drug programs out there to which with -- uhe board does

13

recognize, but it's not like drug board.

14

sentenced to do that, I know that's a whole different thing.

15

THE COURT:

16

And, Mr. Miles, from the State?

17

MR. MILES:

I mean, if I'm

Okay.

Just to make sure I'm

clear, then.

He

18

was already sent to prison on a case of driving under the

19

i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l , a n d I guess that w a s --

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

I never had a DUI m

my life.

I was

sentenced for shoplifting.

22

MR. MILES:

23

influence

Charge 30, felony, driving under the

of a l c o h o l , p l e d

24

I

THE C O U R T :

25

I

THE D E F E N D A N T :

guilty to --

It was the theft.

D i a n e W.
R01

It was

Flanagan,
39S.1056

theft

PPR

MR. COLE:

Theft.

MR. MILES:
MR. COLE:

Oh, so that's a misprint -Yeah.

MR. MILES:

—

THE DEFENDANT:

on the PSI as well?
There was a couple of misprints I

found in there too.
PROBATION OFFICER:
MR. MILES:

Okay.

It's theft.
So that theft he's already been

sent to prison on -PROBATION OFFICER:
MR. MILES:

Yes.

-- which is why he's appearing out of

prison today.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. MILES:

And so he's been serving a term of

imprisonment on that case pending the resolution of this
case .
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. MILES:

When was sentencing on the

THE COURT:

It was set for -- as Mr. Cole pointed

'06 case,

then?

out, for March of '06.

But the incident -- this incident

actually predated the Judge Page incident, the theft.
MR. MILES:
served from

T

Okay.

So he's asking credit for time

04 to '06?

MR. COLE:

Well, he's been in custody.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR

5

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

Yeah, he's been in aboui -- the

last time I checked it was almost 600 days then.
MR. MILES:

The State wouldn't have a problem giving

him credit for time served when he was actually being held on
this charge, but for the period of time he's been in prison
on the other offense -THE COURT:

On the other one.

MR. MILES:

-- I don't know that he would be

entitled to credit that given that he was serving a term of
imprisonment imposed for that offense.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. MILES:

So the State would ask you not credit

him for that portion of it.

This defendant has a horrible

criminal record -- I'm looking at it -- 52 some odd arrests,
multiple felony convictions.
probation numerous times.

The defendant has been on

Whether he's successfully

completed it or not, his criminal history shows somebody who
simply is not going to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
So the real question, I think, today is not whether
he should go to prison but whether it should run concurrent
or consecutive, and I think given the nature of his record
and the multitude of his offenses that Your Honor should send
him down consecutively to the offense he's currently doing
now even though you can credit him for time served, because

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
a m -^QS i 0S6

6

this defendant simply has earned that at this point.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

Any legal reason why sentence cannot be imposed?
MR. COLE:
THE COURT:
coming.

No, Your Honor.
Okay.

Mr. Carter, this is a long time

It's been about a year just to try to get it to the

sentencing point, but I ! m going to do the following.

In

connection with your conviction of a second degree felony,
possession of a controlled substance, considering all of the
things that have been said here and m

the past on the --

similar hearings like this and recognizing

m

the nature of the

offense, I'm going to do the following.
I'm going to sentence you to the Utah State Prison
for one indeterminate term of one to 15 years, give you
credit for the time that you have served and run it
concurrent with any other sentence that you may be serving.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Carter.

(End of proceedings.)

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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ST^TE OF UTAH

)

2

COUNTY OF WEBER )
I, DIANE W. FLANAGAN, RPR, Official Court Reporter

3

in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the
foregoing is a true and correct transcription from the
6

videotape recording of the proceedings m

7

matter.

the above-entitled

8
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or

9
10

employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a

11

relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or

12
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this action.

13
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14

15
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16
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17
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